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Rights disputes procedures in Canada and 
New Zealand 
Joseph B. Rose* 
This paper examines the resolution of rights disputes in Canada and New Zealand. 
It begins with an overview of the statutory distinction between interest and rights 
disputes and traces the development of rights disputes procedures in both countries. 
This is followed by a comparison of the characteristics of rights disputes procedures 
in each country, e.g., scope and third-party involvement. The final section 
considers the performance of disputes procedures, including whether they act as a 
strike substitute and provide timely and cost effective dispute resolution. The 
implications of these findings for en1ploynzent justice also are considered. 
1. Introduction 
Although Canada and New Zealand share a British heritage and have adopted labour 
policies that encourage government intervention for the prevention and settlement of 
industrial disputes, each has developed a distinctive approach to the settlement of disputes 
during the life of a collective agreement or an award. As well, the distinction between 
interest and rights disputes commonly found in North America and northern Europe, was 
not formally adopted in New Zealand until 1973.1 
The primary objective of this paper is to provide a broad comparison of dispute 
resolution in the private sector. It is recognised that within each country the methods of 
dispute resolution may vary, e.g., bet ween the pri vatc and puhlic sector or among the 
federal and provincial jurisdictions in Canada. Although a detailed review of these 
differences is beyond the scope of this paper, occasional references arc made to significant 
departures from national patterns of dispute resolution. 
Conflict arising out of contract negotiations normally is descr ibed as an interest 
dispute, whereas conflict associated with contract interpretation or administration is 
referred to as a rights dispute. Government intervention ini tially focussed on the 
negotiation of collective agreements and the establishment of awards. By the early 
1900s, New Zealand had adopted a system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration, 
whereas Canada inLroduced compulsory conciliation (i.e., the establishment of 
conciliation boards with the authority to investigate disputes and make non-binding 
recommendations for settlement). 
* 
1 
tvfcMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada L8S 4~14. The author gratefully 
acknowledges the comments of Roy Adams, Gordon Anderson, Gary Chaison, John 
Decks, Kevin H ince, Bill Hodge, Richard M i tche1l, David Plowman, 1 anet Scoll and three 
anonymous referees on an earlier draft of this paper. 
However, the existence of rights disputes was acknowledged in the Industrial Conciliation 
and Arbitration Act 1951 which provided that any award or agreement may create local 
disputes committees to settle any dispute or difference between the parties, including any 
maller arising out of or connected with an award or agreement. 
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In North America, the recognition of rights disputes and the development of grievance 
and arbitration procedures gained impetus in the 1930s when collective bargaining moved 
from the organisational stage to the contract development stage (Slichter, Healy and 
Livemash, 1960). The widespread adoption of private procedures in the United States 
provided a model for Canada. To facilitate the peaceful seulement of rights disputes, 
Privy Council Order 1003 (1944) prohibited strikes and lockouts during the life of a 
collective agreement and required that aJl unresolved disputes be submitted to final and 
binding arbitration. Following World War 2, federal and provincial collective bargaining 
laws adopted thi s approach. All collec tive agreements must provide for the final 
resolu tion of rights disputes by arbitration or some other means. The vast majority of 
collective agreements have adopted grievance arbitration as the method of dispute 
settlement. Legislative policies "favoured the general withdrawal of the courts and of 
direct economic action from the field of contract enforcement, ... and their replacement by 
a comprehensive system of grievance arbitration" (Adell, 1970, p. 166). 
In general, Canadian labour law requires collective agreements to provide for the 
arbitration of all differences between the parties. It also contains a model arbitration 
clause which specifics how arbitration board members are to be selected, time limi ts and 
what constitutes a majority board decision. If the parties fail to incorporate an arbitration 
procedure in their agreement or include one that docs not meet the minimum statutory 
requirements, the model clause is deemed to form part of the collec tive agreement. 
Additionally, there arc numerous legal ground rules for grievance arbitration, e.g., the 
appointment of arbitrators2 and the enforcement of arbitration awards. Although the legal 
framework governing rights disputes may appear considerable, the parties are free to 
design their own internal grievance procedures and have wide latitude to negotiate 
arbitration procedures which go beyond statutory minima. 
In New Zealand, no attempt was made lO distinguish interest and rights disputes and 
develop grievance procedures throughout most of the twentieth century. There have been 
several reasons for this. First, most employees were covered by awards that established 
minimum working conditions on an industry-wide or district basis. Since these 
conditions could be supplemented by negotiations between unions and individual 
employers, 1t was difficult to distinguish interest disputes from rights disputes. Second, 
at the workplace level, there was and continues to be a minimum of formal rule-making. 
Moreover, the prevalence of unwrillcn customs and practices made the righLs- intcrest 
dichotomy less meaningful (Geare, 1983). Third, multi-unionism at the enterprise level 
and award proliferation made it difficult to establish good relations and communications 
necessary to develop uniform procedures to handle rights disputes. 
Notwithstanding these factors, it was widely acknowledged that workplace grievances 
constituted a persistent and major source of work stoppages. In the early 1970s, New 
Zealand moved toward the North American model by making a distinction between 
interest and rights disputes. This was first recognised in the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Amendment Act 1970. It specified a voluntary procedure for wrongful 
dismissal and a mandatory procedure for disputes of rights. This was prompted by 
growing labour unrest in the 1960s and pressure from employer representatives who had 
visi ted the United States and were impressed by collectively bargained grievance 
procedures. Support for grievance procedures came not only frorn employers wishing to 
prevent strike action over dismissals, but unions (particularly the weaker unions) seeking 
compensation and/or reinsta tement for dismissed workers (Gcare, 1983). There was a 
2 Where the parties arc unable to select an arbilrator, the appropriate Minister of Labour may 
be asked to make an appointment. A number of expedited grievance arbitration procedures 
require Ministerial appointments of arbitrators or give a labour relations board jurisdiction 
to arbitrate grievances. Although there arc no national data on the proportion of 
appointments made by government departments or agencies, there is clearly a greater 
public aspect to arbilration in Canada than in the United States (Rose, 1989). 
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general concern with deficiencies in the common law handling of dismissals, e.g., 
employers were not required to give reasons for dismissal or justify any reasons, and 
reinstatement was not available as a remedy (Anderson, 1988). 
The Industrial Relations Act 1973 required that ail awards and agreements incorporate 
2 statutory procedures, one for disputes of rights (i.e., the interpretation, application or 
operation of an award or agreement) and the other for personal grievances (unjustifiable 
dismissal and other employer actions which disadvantage an individual employee). A 
mechanism was established which permitted the parties to moclify the statutory procedures 
or develop alternative grievance procedures. The statutory procedures provided for the 
establishment of grievance and disputes committees, mediation and arbitration. Thus, as 
in Canada, the procedures provided for the arbitration of all differences pursuant to an 
award or agreement. While the Industrial Relations Act 1973 was a sign ificant 
development, the need for reform was recognised in the Government's Green Paper on 
industrial relations (Department of Labour, 1985). As described below, the Labour 
Relations Act 1987 introduced a nurnber of changes, including a broader definition of 
personal grievances, greater accessibility to the procedures and establishment of the 
Labour Court to succeed the Arbitration Court) The revised statutory procedures were 
extended to government workers by virtue of the State Sector Act 1988 and to 6 
industries previously covered by other labour laws (Htnce and Yranken, 1989). 
2. Characteristics of grievance procedures 
Table 1 summarises the major characteristics of grievance procedures. Four features 
are compared: (1) coverage; (2) structural characteristics; (3) third party tntcrvenuon; and 
( 4) compliance. 
Coverage 
Two central aspects of coverage are the scope of grievable issues and access to 
grievance procedures. In general, the protection provtdcd by grievance and arbitratton 
procedures in Canada is determined by the substantive prO\ isions of the collective 
agreement. The scope of collective bargaming allows the parties to negotiate over any 
and all issues they wish to pursue. As a resu1t, collective agreements will reflect the 
interests and relative bargaining power of the parties and will de fine the rights and 
obligations of the parties. They also contain elaborate grievance and arbitration clauses to 
facilitate the administration and enforcement of the collective agreement. In designing 
these clauses, the parties must sau sf y the statutory requirement for final and binding 
arbitration of all unresolved differences arising from the collective agreement. The latter 
requirement prevents the parues from excluding designated contract terms from grievance 
arbitration as is permissible in the United States. 
3 The new law reorganised the Arbitration Court into the Arbitr~tion Comrr,ission (interest 
disputes) and the Labour Court (disputes of righLS, personal grievances and enforcement). 
Hereinafter, the term Court is used in the text. 
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The parties negotiate 
comprehensive collective 
agreements with elaborate 
grievance and arbitration 
procedures. All disputes 
involving the collective 
agreement arc subject to 
arbitration. 
There arc detailed multi-step 
procedures with hierarchical 
appeals; unresolved matters 
may be referred to arbitration. 
There is a system of quasi-
public arbitration. Arbitrators 
arc selected on an ad hoc basis 
and cases arc heard by single 
arbitrators or tripartite boards. 
The law prohibitS mid-contract 
work stoppages and substitutes 
arbitration as the final and 
bindmg method of dispute 
resolution. Arbll.rJtion awards 
arc enforceable tn the courts. 
New Zealand 
Prior to 1987, negotiations 
were limited to "industrial 
matters" and statutory 
procedures were narrow in 
scope. Since 1987, "industrial 
matters" and the statutory 
procedures have been 
broadened. 
Statutory procedures arc 
primarily concerned with the 
establishment and operation of 
tripartite committees. Some 
dcl.ails are provided concerning 
settlement procedures prior to 
the commiuce stage in the 
ca~e of personal grievances. 
Disputes and personal 
gnevance committees are 
chaired by government-
employed mediators. If a 
matter is not settled at that 
stage, it may be referred to the 
Labour Court. 
The statutory procedures 
provide for final and b1nding 
wtthout work stoppages. In 
the past, enforcement has 
depended on voluntary 
compliance. S incc 1987, the 
Labour Court has been given 
broader powers to order 
compliance with procedures. 
Grievances may be initiated on behalf of any employee covered by a collective 
agreement (t.e., un10n members and non-members altke) and typically 1nvolve individual, 
group or union policy grievances. Frequently grieved issues Include discipline, dtscharge, 
seniority, wages and other payments. For a gnevance to be arbitrable, the matter in 
dispute must be founded on a v1olauon of the collective agreement. tv1orl;over, most 
collective agreements sltpu I aLe that an arb1Lrator tS proh 1bttcd from maktng a dcetston 
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which is inconsistent with the collective agreement or would alter, modify, amend, or add 
to its tenns. 
In New Zealand, disputes procedures initially provided narrower coverage and 
protection than is found in Canada. Whereas the parties could bargain over any lawful 
issue, prior to 1987, the scope of bargaining was defined by statute to include "industrial 
mauers". Although the term "industrial mauers" appeared to be broadly defined, it was 
interpreted restrictively by the courts. In a strict sense, this meant the scope of 
negotiations could be confined to a narrow range of issues (e.g., wages, hours and 
working conditions); mauers such as technological change, work methods and 
superannuation were deemed It nonindustrial matters". (In practice, this did not eliminate 
negotiations and connict over "nonindustrial matters"; disputes involving such issues 
often were settled without jurisdictional challenges). Most disputes of rights pertained to 
wage payments and allowances (e.g., overtime and travel). Another difficulty was that 
centrally negotiated awards and agreements were commonly supplemented by enterprise-
level agreements, which varied in scope and formality, e.g., from wrillen agreements to 
oral understandings and practices (Miller, 1984 ). Because central awards established 
minimum conditions and enterprise-level agreements often did not provide a 
comprehensive code of employment, there was considerable variability in the protection 
provided by statutory procedures. The parties infrequently adopted alternatives to 
statutory procedures. Alternative procedures have included modifications such as the 
creation of a unified disputes committee (to handle disputes of rights and personal 
grievances) and vesting final decision-making authority in the grievance com mittee 
chairperson (Anderson, 1978). 
The widespread adoption of statutory procedures imposed some additional constraints. 
For example, the personal grievance procedure was available only to union members 
covered by an award (Anderson, 1988). The Court also took a narrow approach with 
respect to remedies. For example, reinstatement was infrequently used as a remedy in 
unjust dismissal cases. As for per<:>onal grievances involving other employer actions that 
disadvantage a worker's employment, the Court held this did not apply to issues such as 
denial of promotion, demotions and transfers. Normally a disadvantage had to Involve a 
"tangible and demonstrable financial loss" (Anderson, 1988, p. 268). As well, 
disadvantage did not apply to workplace mallers affecting a group of employees (Miller, 
1984). It is worth noting that the Court did adopt a liberal approach with regard to 
procedural fairness. 
Many of the foregoing restrictions were removed or modified by the Labour Relations 
Act 1987. Personal grievances were defined to include unjustifiable dismissal, 
unjustifiable action, discrimination, sexual harassment and duress (i.e., in relation to 
memocrship or non-membership in a union). The inclusion of "unjustifiable" actions by 
employers should enable employees to challenge management decisions that involve 
matters other than pecuniary loss. Coverage was also extended to all union members 
irrespective of award coverage and to include disadvant.ageous actions affecting more than 
one employee. As well, reinstatemen t was eslablished as the primary remedy in unjust 
dismissal cases. It should be noted, however, that grievance committees and the Court 
may continue to find reinstatement impracticable under certain circumstances, e.g., where 
there was a personal aspect to the employment relationship or cases involving long 
delays (Hughes, 1988). More broadly, the new law no longer limits bargaining to 
industrial matters. If the scope of bargaining expands in the future, unions presumably 
will be in a better position to challenge management prerogatives through the dispute of 
righL~ procedure. Additionally, employment condi tions arc now regulated by single-tier 
bargaining, i.e., a worker can be covered by only one enforceable registered agreemcnL 
, 
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Structural characteristics 
In Canada, there arc multi-step grievance procedures (e.g., 3 to 4 steps) with 
hierarchical appeals wilhin specified time limits. Normally a grievor would discuss a 
matter with his or her immediate supervisor in an attempt to resolve a dispute before 
initiating a fonnal grievance. Unresolved issues would be referred to higher ranking 
union and management officials at each step of the procedure. Some grievances, e.g., 
discharge grievances, normally are processed more expeditiously and may entitle a grievor 
to union representation at all disciplinary meetings with management and written reasons 
for discharge. Failing a settlement in the internal grievance procedure, the matter may be 
referred to arbitration. 
In New Zealand, the statutory procedures do not place much emphasis on dispute 
settlement activities prior to the establishment of committees. However, the personal 
grievance procedure docs require an individual-supervisor meeting and the exchange of 
written documents. It is acknowledged that unions and employers nonnally consult and 
negotiate at the plant level prior to referring a dispute to the committee stage. However, 
such activities arc informal and unstructured, and written procedures similar to those 
found in North America arc the exception rather than the rule. The statutory procedures 
stipulate that disputes are to be referred to commiuees, normally composed of an equal 
number of representatives from the employer and the union (usually up to 3 each) and 
chaired by a mediator. Under specified circumstances (described below), disputes may be 
referred from the committee stage to the Court 
In Canada, unresolved grievances may be heard by a single arbitrator or a tripartite 
board. Arbitrators normally arc selected on an ad hoc basis by the parties. When the 
parties are unable to agree on an arbitrator (or the chairperson of a board), the Minister of 
Labour may be asked to make an appointment. Arbitrators arc responsible for scheduling 
hearings and determining the procedure of the hearing. The parties share equally the fees 
and expenses of the arbitrator (or chairperson). Resort to non-binding procedures, e.g., 
grievance mediation, is uncommon, but has become more prevalent in recent years (Rose, 
1989). 
The statutory procedures in New Zealand emphasise mediation-arbitration. A dispute 
of rights may be initiated by either party or, more commonly, by mutual agreement, by 
referring unresol v~ matters to tripartite disputes committees chaired by a neutral (usually 
a mediator from the Mediation Service). When the parties cannot agree to a mediator, the 
Mediation Service may appoint one. Failing a settlement by a majority of the committee 
(exclusive of the chairperson) the mediator may either issue a decision (which may be 
appealed to the Court) or refer the matter directly to the Court. As well, either party may 
refer a matter directly to the Court when the other party has failed to observe the disputes 
procedure. A decision by the Court is final and binding. 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 modified the personal grievance procedure to 
encourage settlements at the commiuee stage and to minimise delays associated wllh 
referring unresolved grievances to the Court. Specifically, it required the appointment of 
chairpersons to grievance committees, gave them decision-making authority, provided for 
appeals of chairperson decisions to the Court and allowed the chairperson to refer a 
grievance dtrectly to the Coun rather than making a decision. This is comparable to the 
practice with disputes con1miuees. In the past, the chairperson of a grievance comrniuce 
did not enter the dispute with decision-making authority. Where the parties conferred 
such authority on the mediator, the mediator's decision was final and binding. In ca"cs 
where the mediator was not given decision-making authority, the grievance could be 
referred from the committee stage to the Court for a binding decision. 
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Compliance 
In Canada, strikes and lockouts arc prohibited during the life of a collective agreement 
and damages may be awarded for economic losses suffered as a result of an illegal work 
stoppage. An arbitrator's decision is final and binding on the parties to the collective 
agreement and the employees covered by it. Where there is non-compliance with an 
arbitrator's award, the award can be filed with the relevant court, whereupon it becomes an 
order of the court Further non-compliance would constitute contempt of court and could 
result in a fine and/or imprisonment. Judicial review of arbitrators' decisions is permitted 
in specified circumstances, e.g., an error of law. 
New Zealand's statutory procedures arc intended to provide final and bindjng decisions 
without resort to work stoppages. A decision by the Court may only be appealed on a 
question of law. A work stoppage over a dispute of rights or personal grievance is 
considered a breach of the award or agreement. However, prior to 1987 doubts existed 
about the adequacy of penalties to deter non-compliance with the statutory procedures 
(Department of Labour, 1985, Volume 2). The Labour Relations Act 1987 included 
provisions ajmed at encouraging observance of the procedures by the parties. It gave the 
Court broader powers including the authority to issue compliance orders in a number of 
circumstances, e.g., the failure to comply with decisions of a disputes committee, 
grievance comm ittcc and the Court. Non-observance of a compliance order could result in 
stiffer fines, imprisonment and seizure of property. As well, responsibility for selected 
economic torts and injunctive relief was shifted to the Court (Hince and Vranken, 1989). 
3. The performance of rights disputes procedures 
Three performance measures of righlS disputes procedures arc considered. These 
include: (1) strike prevention; (2) seulement stage; and (3) time and cost effectiveness. 
The comparative analysis is subject to 2 limitations. First, since it is still too early to 
assess the impact of the Labour Relations Act 1987, comparisons with New Zealand 
cover the pre-1987 period. Second, the diversity of grievance procedure characteristics and 
data limitations make it difficult to make direct comparisons for all of the criteria. 
Accordingly, quantitative and qualitative factors are examined to draw inferences about the 
~rformance of alternative dispute settlement procedures. 
Strike prevention 
Statutory and negotiated rights disputes procedures have a common objective: the 
prevention and settlement of disputes during the life of a collective agreement or an 
award. However, the adoption of grievance and arbitration procedures, no-strike 
provisions and the establishment of enforcement mechanisms are no guarantee of labour 
peace. This is hardly surprising since "wildcat disputes rcOect spontaneous collective 
action born of shared frustration with working or living conditions" (Brett and Goldberg, 
1979, p. 465). These frustrations may result from a variety of factors, including the level 
of economic activity, unsafe working conditions, poor labour-management relations, 
worker militancy, ineffective grievance procedures and delays in contract negotiations 
(Ng, 1987). Although official strike statistics rarely provide detailed reasons for such 
disputes, it is quite probable that a substantial proportion of mid-contract work stoppages 
result from issues grievance procedures were intended to resolve. 
In New Zealand, it is possible to consider the effect of sLawtory personal grievance 
procedures on strikes over dismissals. The evidence reveals no d isccrnible drop in 
dismissal strikes between 1971 and 1984. In facL, dismissals accounted for about 11 
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percent of the disputes in 1984 or about the same level as prevailed in 1973 when 
statutory procedures were introduced (Department of Labour, 1985, Volume 2). 
There appear to be several reasons why the strike wca(X)n was not abandoned in favour 
of the statutory personal grievance procedure. One factor was the genuine concern that 
statutory procedures failed to provide "quick, accessible and reliable dispute resolution 
mechanisms in substitute for industrial action" (Department of Labour, 1985, Volume 2, 
p. 160). Another factor was the failure to stress reinstatement as the remedy for unjust 
dismissal. As well, personal grievances may be linked to other issues such as "an attack 
on the union by dismissing a delegate or just the result of a general state of industrial 
disharmony" (Anderson, 1988, p. 274). Even in industries which adopted alternative 
disputes procedures, strikes remained a potent weapon (Department of Labour, 1985, 
Volume 2; Miller, 1983). The available evidence suggests that some unions were 
dissatisfied with the abtllly of statutory procedures to achieve employment justice in 
terms of procedural fairness and/or equitable outcomes. In such circumstances, 
settlements on the basis of relative bargaining advantage may have been preferable. 
Unfortunately there arc no aggregate measures of the relative use of procedures and 
strtkes to resolve disputes of rights. However, it is noteworthy that the relative frequency 
of strikes (work stoppages per 100,000 employees) in New Zealand is 3 to 4 times 
greater than in Canada (Jackson, 1987). Ad<litionally, the high incidence of short duration 
strikes may reflect an inability to peacefully resolve such disputes. For example, it has 
been shown that nearly 70 percent of the strikes in the post-World War 2 period were 2 
days or less and most of these Involved dtsputcs of rights (Geare, 1983). According to 
Miller (1983) the interest-rights dichotomy had not been accepted and unions with clout 
continued to rely on the strike weapon to settle disputes of rights. Conversely, unions 
with little clout (e.g., clerical workers) were more inclined to adopt the statutory 
proccd urcs. 
Pnor to 19R7, one dtfficulty was the statutory dcfmition of a dispute of rights failed 
to unambiguously dtfferentiate between interest and rights issues. A dispute of rights 
mtght include the Interpretation of the award or col1 ectivc agreement as well as matters 
related to the instrument that arc not clearly or specifically disposed of by it. Since the 
parties could negotiate voluntary agreements to supplemen t awards, it was possible to 
create mtcrcst dtsputes during the currency of an award. This could create jurisdicLional 
problems in as much as some of these maLLcrs arc referred to disputes commi nccs. 
Whereas the law developed separJte procedures for mtcrest and rights disputes and strikes 
were lawful in the pnor case, "some disputes of rights could legally be the subject of 
strike action due to the discrepancy between the scope of Lhe definition of dispute of righL~ 
and the jurisdiction of the disputes committee procedure" (Department of Labour, 1985. 
Volume 2, p. 1 09) The 1987 reforms tightened up the definitions of a dispute of interest 
and a <lisputc of righb, and clarified the circumstances m which strikes arc lawful. 
In concluston, the New Zealand expenence pnor to 1987 demonstrates that statutory 
procedures did not become a subslltutc for industrial acuon, nor did they reduce strikes 
over dtsmissals. 
Canada provides funher evidence that Lhc statu tory prohibition of mid-contract 
dtsputes is no panacea. Although arbitration is almost accepted as the mechanism for 
resolving grievances, it has not cltminatcd work stoppages. From 1960 to 1985, mid-
contract disputes accounted for approxtmatcly 21 percent of work stoppages, 27 percent of 
workers involved and 7 percent of workmg days lost (Labour Canada, 1960-1985 '· 
Admtlledly, some rntd-contract strtke~ arc legal (e.g., a refusal to perform unsafe work) 
and others mvolvc uHerest disputes (e.g., a protest over the lack of progress in contract 
renewal negouauon..;). Nevertheless, a substantial proponion of mid-contract disputes arc 
undoubtedly related to issues within t.he jurisdiction of grievance procedures. 
There is, however, reason to belteve Lhat adherence to procedures is greater in Canada 
than 1n New Zealand. Recall that 1n Canada there 1s not a statutory procedure per sc, but 
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a requirement that the parties establish their own procedure. The grievance and arbitration 
system was conceived of as an antidote to industrial unrest and an instrument of 
cn1ploymcnt justice (Weiler, 1980). As an expression of self-governance, the parties 
have a vested interest in ensuring their judicial systern works. Accordingly, grievance and 
arbitration procedures arc given primacy over strikes. Moreover, given the broad scope of 
Canadian procedures and the more explicit sanctions against mid-contract disputes, one 
would anticipate there would ~ grcalCr reliance on the procedures. 
One way of estimating this is to examine the proportion of Canadian strikes 
attributable to dismissals and compare the results with New Zealand. Canadian data 
provide reasons for strikes in disp utes involving 100 or more workers. For the period 
1971 to 1984, only 2.3 percent of the work stoppages were related to employee 
dismissals. Although the Canadian data do not include small er bargaining units and 
therefore may understate the incidence of such strikes, the results suggest substantially 
greater compliance with procedures in Canada. As a perccnLagc of all work stoppages, 
dismissal strikes occur about 4 times more often in New Zealand than in Canada. 
It also is possible to estimate the rclati ve usc of sLrikcs versus disputes procedures In 
Canada and New Zealand. Based on figures from the province of Ontario, it was 
estimated there arc 2 to 3 mid-conLract strikes for every 100 arbiLration awards issued.4 
This is well below the ratio in New Zealand reported by Miller ( 1983). His case studies 
showed there were as many strikes and often significantly more strikes than decisions by 
committee chairpersons and the Court. If we restrict the comparison to dismissals, the 
results arc equally startling. In Canada, it was estimated there was less than 1 strike over 
dismissals for every 100 discharge arbitration decisions between 1973 and 1984.5 For the 
period 1982-1984, New Zealand experienced an estimated 18 strikes over dismissals for 
every 100 decisions made by grievance committee chairpersons and 14 strikes for each 
100 decisions issued by chairpersons and the Court. The evidence clearly indicates that 
the relative use of grievance procedures is greater in Canada and the resort to work 
stoppages is greater in New Zealand. It1~ reasonable to conclude that procedures arc a 
more effective strike substitute in Canada. 
It appears that the reliance on disputes procedures reflects differences in the attitudes 
and expectations of the parttcs and general d1ffcrenccs in induslrial relations systems. In 
Canada, the parties assumed the responsibility for designing a system of contract 
enforcement. In general, grievance and arbitration procedures have been accepted as 
providing fair and workable solutions to employment problen1s, and a practical alternative 
to direct economic action. This type of comrniunent has been queslioncd in New Zealand 
(Department of Labour, 1985, Volume 1, p. 25). 
Automatic insertion of the standard procedures can be argued to lessen the 
commitment of the parties to then1 and hence act to discourage Lheir observance. 
However, it is debatable whether, in their absence, it could be guaranteed that 
adequate procedures would be negotiated and inserted in all awards and collective 
agreements. 
Contextual factors also have innucnccd the commitment to disputes procedures. It 
has been observed that the distinction between interest and rights disputes is more 
suitable Loa system characterised by individual firn1 collective agreements which specify 
4 This estimate covers 1973 to 1985 and is based on the following assumptions: (a) Ontario 
accounted for 30 percent of the mid contract disputes in Canada; (b) three-quarters of the 
mid-contract strikes involve rights disputes; (c) the number of arbitration awards reported 
to the Ontario Ministry of Labour accounts for 90 percent of all awards. 
5 Based on the assumption that Ontario accounts for 30 percent of the mid-contract strikes 
and discharge arbitrations represent 23 percent of all arbitration cases (Rose, 1986). 
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the actual terms and conditions of employment than it is to industry or district awards 
which establish minimum conditions (Geare, 1983). As well, legal penalties seem to 
have had a greater impact on union behaviour in Canada than in New Zealand. However, 
there is anecdotal evidence that the reforms introduced in 1987 have encouraged greater 
reliance on procedures to resolve disputes of rights and personal grievances. 
Settlement stage 
Grievance procedure effectiveness may be said to occur when settlements are achieved 
as close to the point of origin as possible or with infrequent recourse to neutral third 
parties, e.g., arbitrators (Lewin, 1984). The settlement stage not only has implications 
for the lime and cost of dispute seulement, but also reflects the ability of the parties to 
achieve informal and mutually acceptable settlements. The evidence suggests third party 
adjudication is infrequent. 
In New Zealand, the vas t majority of disputes of rights and personal grievances arc 
selllcd voluntanly. Unfortunately data are not available on grievance initiation or 
settlement rates prior to the formal hearings by grievance and disputes committees. 
However, Miller (1984 , p. 128) reported that with the exception of 5 strike-prone 
industries, most n ghts disputes and personal grievances are settled "without work 
stoppages and without the invol vcmcnt of neutrals". Although difficult to quantify, our 
interviews with practitioners and Miller's results (1 983) suggest that perhaps as many as 
90 percent of the cases arc se ttled prior to the formal hearing stage. 
The vas t majority of disputes of rights and personal grievances referred to committees 
arc settled at the hearing stage. From 1979 to 1982, 40 percent of the cases were settled 
by the parties and 50 percent were resolved by a chairperson's decision. Case studies of 4 
pri vate sector mdusLrtes in the p~riod 1977 to 1981 produced similar results (Miller, 
1983). From 1982 to 1984 , 45 percent of the cases were settled by the parties and 36 
percent by a chairperson's decision. It is worth noting that these figures actually 
understate the ex tent of settlement achieved by the parties. Our interview results were 
consistent with earlier findin gs, namely that decisions by chairpersons "frequentl y 
incorporate partial or full settlement reached by employers and unions" (Miller, 1983, p. 
22). In conclusiO'l, mediation stimulates negotiated settlements . 
While these resul ts arc signi ficant, the effec tiveness of the procedures is problemat..ic 
for several reasons. First, be tween 1979 and 1984, approximately 12 percent of the cases 
that reached the comm iuec stage were referred to or appealed to the Court (Miller, 1983 
and Department of Labour, 1985, Volume 2) . This appears to be substantially higher 
than the referrJl rJtc for unsettled gri evances in North America (discussed below) and may 
reflect the less we ll defined procedures prior to the comm iLtcc stage. It also suggests that 
the cost of dtsagrccmg at the commtllce stage and proceeding to the Court is very low. 
Second, and perhaps more importantl y, the final dispos ition of 15 to 20 percent of the 
cases at the comm ittee stage is reported as "unsettled". It is significant that many of 
these cases did not get resolved either at the committee stage or by the Court. For 
example, 167 of the 437 (38 per cent) unsettled personal grievances were never referred to 
the Court. Al though the precise rea~ons for this pattern is not known , considering that 
mos t of these ca'"'c') in volve di ~missa l s, 1t docs ra1se important qucsuons about the 
opcrauon of the procedure (Deparllnent of Labour, 1985, Volume 2). 
Several &;pcct') of se ttlement patterns in Canada (and North Amcnca generally) may 
be dis tinguished from New Zealand First, it appears that the vast majority of grievance~ 
arc more often resolved close to the point of orig1n , i.e., informally or at the first or 
second step in the grievance procedure (Lewin , 1984; Gandz and Whitehead 1989). 
Second, onl y a 'imall fraction of wriucn grievances (e.g. , 1 to 2 percent) reach the 
arb itration stage. Th1s pattern is a function of many factors including the parties' ability 
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and willingness to settle grievances, precedents within the workplace (Knight, 1986), the 
existence of a large body of arbitral jurisprudence and principles, and the desire to control 
the outcome of the grievance and avoid, where possible, the cost and delays associated 
with arbitration. Based on the foregoing , there is substantially greater emphasis placed 
on private settlement and less dependence on third-party neutrals in Canada. Part of the 
difference between the 2 countries also may be related to New Zealand's compulsory 
unionism and blanket award coverage system. For example, it may produce a different 
grievance pattern by allowing employees of small employers and less organised industries 
the opportunity to file grievances. 
A third distinction is that one is unlikely to find as many unseuled grievances in 
Canada. While there may well be grievances that arc abandoned, there is no evidence to 
refute the general perception that virtually all grievances either get settled or are 
withdrawn. Unions also may place unresolved grievances "on holt!" until the next round 
of contract negotiations and attempt to seule outstanding grievances in exchange for 
employer concessions (Adams and Zeytinoglu, 1987). This undoubtedly reflects the 
high-priority placed on contract enforcement and grievance handling as core services 
provided by unions to their members. It would be difficult under any circumstances to 
imagine as many personal grievances (e.g., dismissals) remllining unsettled in Canada as 
reported in New Zealand. This pattern may also reflect different union responses to the 
duty of fair representation, i.e., the requirement that unions protect the rights of all 
employees covered by a collective agreement. For example, a recent Canadian study 
reported that one effect of the fair representation doctrine may be to force unions to devote 
greater resources to non-meritorious grievances, even at the risk of diminishing union 
effectiveness (Knight, 1987). 
Time and cost considerations 
While it is acknowledged that dispute settlernent should be cost and time effective, 
few procedures satisfy these criteria. In New Zealand, there is a consensus that disputes 
are processed expeditiously up to the point of a referral or an appeal to the Court. Miller 
(I 983) reported the elapsed time between the decision to invoke the statutory procedures 
and the convening of a committee meeting with a mediator ranged from a couple of days 
to a month; the average period was two weeks. Our interview results concurred with this 
estimate. This compares quite favourably with the time required to convene an arbitration 
hearing in North America. 
The principal source of delay was with resolving disputes before the Court. Miller 
(1983) reported that for personal grievances the elapsed time between the application and 
the hearing was about 3 months. Bet ween 1980 and 1983, the time interval for 
scheduling hearings rose from 12 weeks to 22 weeks. Additionally, it often took 4 to 6 
months to schedule hearings for referrals or appeals from disputes commi ttees 
(Department of Labour, 1985, Volume 2). According to our interview results, it could 
then take upwards of an additional 2 to 3 months for the Court to render its decision . 
Part of the Court's difficulty was related to the fact there was only one judge during 
most of the 1970s and the Court had to travel to cities outside of Wellington. As a 
result, the Court's capacity to deal with its workload was hindered. For example, 
although only a small proportion of the personal grievances proceed from the committee 
stage to the Court, in 1983, these cases constituted 21.2 percent of the Court's cascload 
(second largest issue) and consumed 31.3 percent of the Court's hearing days (the most 
Lime consuming issue). These delays, particularly in regard to personal grievances, were 
described as: ' 
so significant that the effectiveness of the procedure as a mechanism for dealing 
with dismissals has been eroded. The delay makes reinstatement as a remedy 
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difficult for the Court to apply. In terms of the effect on the parties, the delay 
factor allows employers to take the attitude "let's wait and see if it disappears" and 
encourages unions to take action outside the procedures e.g., industrial action, 
which the procedure was designed to prevent. It also conflicts with the intended 
objective of the procedure: the provision of a convenient means of settling 
personal grievances as close as possible to the point of origin (Department of 
Labour, 1985, Volume 2, p. 165). 
Indeed, it was these concerns that led to the 1987 legislative changes making 
reinstatement the primary remedy for unjust dismissals. 
The cost associated with the statu tory procedures is quite modest by North American 
standards. Mediation at the committee stage and Court hearings involve no fees. The 
legal costs of dispute settlement also appear modest because the system seems to be less 
formal and legalistic (Miller, 1984). 
It is still too earl y to determine whether the reforms contained in the Labour Relations 
Act 1987 will ex pcdi te dispute resolution. On the one hand, procedural changes (e.g., 
allowing grievance committees to proceed where the employer fails to attend) should 
minimise delays, and granting mediators decision-making authority may reduce the 
Court's in volvement with personal grievances. As well, decentralisation of the Court to 
3 cities and an mcrease in the number of judges should expedite dispute resolution. On 
the other hand , the Court's caseload could increase as a result of broadening the definition 
of a personal grievance, extend ing statu tory procedures to the state sector and acquiring 
the power to 1ssue compliance orders, injunctions and award damages. A s well, it 
remains to be seen what affect these changes will have on the capacity of mediators and 
committees to achtevc fmal and binding settlements. Some interviewees felt that giving 
mediators decision-making authority would make grievance committee activities more 
formal and legalistic. The cost of dispute settlement would undoubtedly rise if the 
demand for legal services increases. 
In Canada, frequent concerns arc expressed regarding time and cost effecti veness. 
Although collective agreements establish time limits for process ing grievances from one 
step of the procedure to the next, time requirements are routinely extended by mutual 
agreement. This is because grievance cascloads often exceed the capacity of union and 
management officials to process c~es exped itiously. Further delays arc encountered in 
selecting arbitrators and schcdulmg hearings (some arbitrators must be booked 6 or more 
months in advance). As a result, it takes nearly one year from the date of the incident 
giving n sc to a gnevance to the tssuancc of an arbitration award (Rose, 1986). 
Arbitration 1s expensive. Arbitrators fees for a one day hearing and preparation of an 
award range from $800 to S 1800 in Ontario and $1500 to $2500 in Alberta. Although 
arbitrators' fees have been crillc tsed by unions, it is recognised that qualified arbitrators 
arc in short supply. Normally arbitrators' fees and related expenses (e.g., hotel and travel 
costs) arc shared equally by the parties. As well, the parties will incur additional costs, 
e.g., legal counsel , fees paid to nominees on arbitration boards and lost wages to its 
witnesses. Clearly arbitration costs have risen as a result of the increasing reliance on 
legal counsel and as hcanngs become more formal and legalistic (Gandz and Whitehead, 
1989). 
Concerns over delays and cos ts have led to the introd uction of both private and 
sta tutory expedited arbttration procedures. Although these innovations have produced 
substantial time and cost savings, on ly a modest number of schemes have been adopted in 
Canada. However, in the province of Ontario, expedited arbitration accounts for 
approximately 40 percent of total gnevance arbitration activity (Rose, 1989). 
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4. Summary and conclusions 
This paper identified in1portant differences in rights disputes procedures in Canada and 
New Zealand. In general, Canadian procedures cover a broader range of grievable issues, 
arc more elaborate and rely on arbitration as the principle form of third-party intervention. 
Arbitration is undertaken by private arbitrators on an ad hoc basis. Collective agreements 
must contain a no-strike, no-lockout provision and provide for arbitration as the final and 
binding method of dispute resolution. In contrast, procedures in New Zealand are 
somewhat less structured (at least prior to third-party involvement), place greater 
emphasis on mediation and rely on the Court to adjudicate rights disputes. As in Canada, 
New Zealand requires all awards and agreements to incorporJte statutory procedures (or an 
alternative procedure) and the procedures are intended to serve as a strike substitute. 
In both systems, most grievance settlements arc achieved through informal activities 
or close to the point of origin. Nevertheless, there tends to be less dependence on third 
party neutrals in Canada. This undoubtedly is related to the parties' rel iance on multi-step 
procedures to achieve settlements, the absence of grievance mediation from most 
proccxlures and the higher costs associated with arbttration. As well, it was suggested that 
industrial relations systems characteristics, e.g., compulsory unionism and blanket 
coverage, may also contribute to differences in grievance activity and settlement patterns. 
Due to differences in procedural characteristics, there is considerable variability in the 
time required to settle disputes. Nevertheless, lengthy delays have been a<;sociated with 
private arbitration and Court proceedings. 
These results also indicate grievance and arbitration procedures arc not always adopted 
as an alternative to mid-contract strtkcs. There arc, nevertheless, differences in the 
perceived legitimacy of procedures. In Canada, gr icvance and arbitration procedures enJOY 
widespread acceptance in the labour relations comrnunity. For nearly 50 years, the parties 
have been able to construct an employn1cnt jusllcc system ta1lored to their needs. This 
has been facilitated by a deccntraliscd collective bargaining system and well developed 
shop floor procedures for handling the day to day administration of collective agreements. 
In New Zealand, centraltscd bargaining structures, awards specifying minimum conditions 
and union and management organisational characteristics have limited the commitment to 
fonnal grievance procedures. 
In the absence of data, it is difficult to directly assess the extent to which reliance on 
procedures is related to perceptions of cmployn1ent justice. Il appears that in North 
America there is a stronger commitment to honour written agreements and a greater desire 
for order and stability. Grievance and arbitration procedures arc accepted as an alternative 
to strikes and arc perceived as an indispensable communication channel for discussing and 
resolving problems. Whereas grievance arbitration is often criticised, there 1s a consensus 
that the system is accessible and works well. Owing to differences in institutional 
arrangements and social heritage, grievance and arbiLration procedures, no-strike clauses 
and legal penalties have been perceived differently in New Zealand. To the extent that the 
1987 reforms promote accessibility and employment justice, the proccxlures should gain 
wider acceptance. 
It will be interesting to sec if the adoption of and adherence to rights disputes 
procedures increases in the future. Economic instability and the emergence of a free 
enterprise ideology in New Zealand have created pressures to deregulate the labour market 
(Hince and Vranken, 1989). Efforts to decentralise bargaining structures and move toward 
enterprise-level awards or agreements could profoundly innuence the need for more formal 
and comprehensive workplace disputes procedures. For example, unions might be 
encouraged to negotiate comprehensive multi-step grievance procedures or seek broader 
statutory coverage. The current political and economic climate, with its emphasis on self 
reliance and a diminished role for government, might eventually lead to the adoption of 
other features of the North American model. One outcome could be the emergence of a 
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system of private mediation -arbitration (Hince, 1986). The impact of environmental 
forces on industrial relations generally and disputes procedures in particular will provide 
fertile ground for future research. 
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